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Abstract Half a century ago, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously
adopted two great covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR), which brought force of law to the rights declared in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Both covenants have been widely ratified by the vast
majority of African States. However, a largely neglected area of study has been
assessing the influence of the ICESCR in various parts of the world including
Africa. This article assesses the influence of the ICESCR in Africa. It seeks to show
how the ICESCR, as interpreted by the United Nations Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has, through the 50 years since its adoption,
had influence on the regional and domestic protection of economic, social and
cultural rights (ESC rights) in Africa. The article begins by considering the influ-
ence of the Covenant on the regional protection of human rights in Africa. This is
followed by an analysis of the influence of the Covenant on the protection of ESC
rights in domestic legal systems in Africa focusing primarily on the constitutional
protection of ESC rights. It then considers the limited influence of the Covenant on
national courts’ jurisprudence in African States applying dualist and monist
approaches to international treaties. It ends by making recommendations to maxi-
mize the influence of the ICESCR in the future.
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1 Introduction
16 December 2016 marked 50 years since the United Nations (UN) General
Assembly adopted in 1966 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights1 (ICESCR or Covenant), the most comprehensive international
treaty protecting economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights. Despite the wide
ratification of the ICESCR by the vast majority (90%) of African States,2 there are
no studies evaluating the ‘influence’ (effect) of the Covenant in Africa. As of
November 2016, with the exception of only six States (Botswana, Comoros,
Mozambique, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, São Tomé and Prı́ncipe, and
South Sudan), all other African States were parties to the ICESCR. Out of these,
only eight African States—Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar,
South Africa and Zambia—had entered some reservations or made declarations to
the ICESCR, in particular to Article 13(2)(a) relating to the provision of
‘compulsory and free’ primary education.3 It should be noted that by the time the
ICESCR entered into force on 3 January 1976, only seven African States had ratified
the Covenant.4 Eighteen more African States ratified the Covenant between 1976 to
1989.5 The remaining 23 African States ratified the Covenant from 1990 following
increased global attention to the principle of universality, indivisibility, interde-
pendence, and interrelatedness of all human rights6 and the adoption of new
(democratic and liberal) constitutions in Africa,7 protecting (some) ESC rights
1 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted 16 December
1966, entered into force 3 January 1976, 993 UNTS 3.
2 By November 2016 the following 49 African States were State parties to the ICESCR: Algeria, Angola,
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape (Cabo) Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad,
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda,
United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Comoros and São Tomé and Prı́ncipe had signed
the Covenant but had not ratified it. See United Nations Treaty Collection (UNTC), ICESCR, https://
treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-3.en.pdf.
3 Ibid.
4 These were Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Rwanda and Tunisia.
5 These were Algeria, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Congo, DRC, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia,
Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Morocco, Niger, Sudan, Senegal, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of
Tanzania and Zambia.
6 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in
Vienna on 25 June 1993, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (Part I) (13 October 1993) p. 20, para. 5.
7 Prempeh (2007), pp. 469–506.
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alongside civil and political rights.8 In addition, at least 13 African States had signed
the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR by November 2016, though only three of these
(Cape Verde, Gabon and Niger) had ratified it.9 The Covenant, therefore, enjoys
widespread support in Africa at least viewed in terms of ratification.
The focus of the article is limited to examining the influence of the ICESCR in
Africa because while African States constitute a significant majority of State parties
to the ICESCR, there are no studies engaging with the influence of the Covenant in
Africa. The article, therefore, seeks to examine the following questions. What has
been the influence of the Covenant on the protection of human rights in Africa at
both regional and domestic levels? Has the Covenant had any influence on the
African regional human rights instruments? What has been the influence of the
Covenant, if any, on the constitutional protection of human rights and on national
courts’ jurisprudence in Africa?
The influence of the Covenant can be said to come about where something from
the Covenant flows into and thereby affects the protection of ESC rights in Africa.
This may be reflected in citations of the Covenant by courts and tribunals, treaty
provisions or national legislation or policy concluded on the basis of the ICESCR,
development of new norms based on the Covenant, such as the right to
development, and whether the Covenant has affected human rights teaching,
practice, and policy in Africa. The Covenant’s influence derives mainly from the
obligation of State parties under Article 2(1) ICESCR to ‘take steps’ (legislative and
other measures) to the maximum of available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realisation of ESC rights. It is widely accepted that the
ratification of international human rights treaties is meaningful if the rights
guaranteed in relevant treaties have an effect upon domestic (national or municipal)
protection of human rights, and effective remedies for violations of the protected
rights are available and accessible, at the domestic level.10 Although mere
ratification of international treaties by States with worse human rights records
without translating them into domestic law and policy does not necessarily result in
improved outcomes in terms of human rights realisation and redress of violations,11
it might represent ‘the initiation, culmination, or reconfiguration of a domestic
political struggle’ for better human rights practices.12
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the ICESCR in 2016, this article
considers the influence of the ICESCR in Africa, with its focus mainly on the legal
8 Heyns and Kaguongo (2006), pp. 673–717. See also Constitutions of all African States at African Law
Library, African Constitutions Collection, http://www.africanlawlibrary.net/web/constitutions/overview;
and African Legal Centre, Constitutions of African Countries.
9 These were Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape (Cabo) Verde, Congo, DRC, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. Three of these States, namely Cape (Cabo) Verde, Gabon and
Niger were parties to the Optional Protocol. Central African Republic acceded to the ICESCR on 11
October 2016. See UNTC, Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-3-a.en.pdf.
10 See Anuak Justice Council v. Ethiopia, Communication No. 299/05, 20th Activity Report, (2006)
AHRLR 97, paras. 47–48.
11 Hathaway (2002), p. 1935.
12 Goodman and Jinks (2003) p. 171, at p. 174.
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dimension of the Covenant’s influence (‘legal effects’, i.e., the effect of the
Covenant on the legal protection of human rights), rather than on the ‘actual’,
statistically or empirically verifiable changes brought about by the Covenant. To
place the Covenant in the African regional human rights context, the article begins
by discussing in Sect. 2 the influence of the ICESCR on the African regional human
rights system. It then goes on to examine in Sect. 3 the influence of the ICESCR
upon constitutional protection of human rights in Africa drawing on examples from
former British colonies in Africa (applying a ‘dualist’ approach to the ICESCR) and
former French and Portuguese colonies in Africa (applying a ‘monist’ approach to
the ICESCR). It considers whether the rights protected in the ICESCR are part of
national (‘municipal’, ‘domestic’ or ‘internal’) constitutional law in African States
and, if so, where do these rights feature in the hierarchy of the domestic legal order?
The focus is primarily on the influence of the ICESCR on the constitutional
protection of ESC rights because this is the most effective means of protecting
human rights in Africa. Have rights in the ICESCR been invoked before, or
‘applied’ by national courts in Africa in their judgments? The article ends in Sect. 4
with some concluding observations about the influence of the Covenant in Africa on
the occasion of the 50th anniversary and comments on what needs to be done to
maximize the influence of the ICESCR in the future.
2 Influence of the ICESCR on the African Regional Human Rights
System
At the outset, it must be noted that the ICESCR influenced the drafting, legal
protection and development of ESC rights in the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights13 (African Charter), African Union’s primary human rights
treaty, adopted on 27 June 1981, 15 years after the adoption of the ICESCR. The
African Charter in Articles 15–19 explicitly recognises the following rights, which
are protected in the ICESCR: the right of self-determination; the right to work under
equitable and satisfactory conditions; the right to enjoy the best attainable state of
physical and mental health; the right to education; the protection of the family, and
cultural rights. Although the formulation of the rights in the Charter is narrower than
in the ICESCR, the Charter protects some individual or collective/group rights not
protected in the Covenant. Such rights include the right of all peoples to ‘economic,
social and cultural development’14 and ‘the right to a general satisfactory
environment favourable to their development’.15 Since the scope of the right to
development and the right to a clean (satisfactory) environment are not defined in
the African Charter, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(African Commission) has been influenced by international instruments including
the ICESCR in interpreting these rights broadly.
13 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982),
ratified by 53 member States of the African Union (AU).
14 Ibid., Art. 22.
15 Ibid., Art. 24.
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It is important to stress that the African Commission is empowered to ‘draw
inspiration from international law on human and peoples’ rights’,16 particularly
from the UN instruments such as the ICESCR, when interpreting the Charter. This
provided a legal basis to rely on the ICESCR to develop the jurisprudence of the
African Commission on ESC rights. On this basis, the Commission has relied
directly or indirectly on the ICESCR to develop the scope and content of ESC rights
as well as the corresponding State obligations.
For instance, in its 2016 Resolution on the Right to Education in Africa, the
Commission specifically considered Article 13 of the ICESCR and urged African
States to ‘guarantee the full scope of the right to education’, including the ‘provision
of pre-school, primary, secondary, tertiary, adult education and vocational
training’.17 Using the wording in Article 2 ICESCR, it called on States to adopt
all necessary and ‘appropriate’ measures to the ‘maximum of available resources’ to
promote, provide and facilitate access to education for all in Africa.18 Moreover, in
2010 the Commission adopted principles and guidelines on ESC rights in Africa19
largely drawing inspiration from the ICESCR and the UN Committee on Economic
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR or the Committee) General Comments, which
have developed the normative content of ESC rights and State obligations since the
1990 s.20
Accordingly, the Charter has been interpreted as recognising implicitly other
ESC rights (protected by the ICESCR but) not explicitly stated in the Charter,
for example the right to an adequate standard of living (adequate food, clothing,
housing, water and sanitation), the right to social security, the right to rest and
leisure, and the right to form and join trade unions.21 This is despite the fact
that these rights were deliberately omitted from explicit protection in the
African Charter so as to ‘spare young states too many but important
16 Ibid., Art. 60.
17 Resolution on the Right to Education in Africa, ACHPR/Res.346 (LVIII) 2016, 20 April 2016.
18 Ibid.
19 See African Commission, Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted at the 47th Ordinary
Session of the African Commission held in Banjul, the Gambia, from 12 to 26 May 2010, http://www.
achpr.org/files/instruments/economic-social-cultural/achpr_instr_guide_draft_esc_rights_eng.pdf.
20 The General Comments of the CESCR are available at http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/
treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=9&DocTypeID=11.
21 See, e.g., Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social
Rights (CESR) v. Nigeria, Communication No. 155/96, 15th Annual Activity Report, (2001) AHRLR 60,
paras. 60 and 65 (the Commission implied rights to housing or shelter and food in the African Charter);
Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Another v. Sudan, Communication Nos. 279/03 and 296/05, 28th
Activity Report, (2009) AHRLR 153, para. 212 (the Commission stated that Art. 16 of the African
Charter, which protects the right to health, implicitly protects rights to adequate food and housing,
including the prohibition on forced evictions, and also guarantees the right to water); African
Commission, Guidelines for National Periodic Reports 1989, available at http://www.achpr.org/
instruments/guidelines_national_periodic_reports/, paras. II.A.31-34, para. II.18, paras. 9, 10, and 17;
African Commission Resolution on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa, ACHPR/Res.73
(XXXVI)04 (2004), adopting the ‘Statement on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights in Africa’, adopted
on 17 September 2004, in Pretoria, South Africa, 5 African Human Rights Law Journal (2005), pp. 182-
193, available at http://www.achpr.org/instruments/pretoria-declaration/, para. 10.
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obligations’.22 The African Commission has defined the right to development as
‘an inalienable, individual or collective right, to participate in all forms of
development, through the full realisation of all fundamental rights, and to enjoy
them without unjustifiable restrictions’.23 It follows that the right to develop-
ment imposes obligations on States to respect, protect and fulfil ‘all
fundamental rights’ including civil and political rights as well as all ESC
rights. Thus the Commission has confirmed that: ‘The right to development will
be violated when the development in question decreases the well-being of the
community’.24 Such well-being entails all ESC rights protected in the ICESCR
such the right to housing including freedom ‘to choose where to live’,25 right to
water and sanitation,26 right to adequate food,27 and the right to economic self-
determination, i.e. the right of all peoples to ‘freely dispose of their wealth and
natural resources’.28
The content of some treaty provisions protecting ESC rights in other later African
Union regional human rights treaties protecting specific vulnerable groups, such as
children, women, the youth, internally displaced persons, older persons and persons
with disabilities were heavily influenced, at least in part, by the ICESCR. Such
treaties include the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child29; the
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa30; the African Youth Charter31; the Convention for the Protection
22 See Rapporteur’s Report on the Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/Draft Rapt.Rpt. (II) Rev.4, para. 13.
23 Open Society Justice Initiative v. Côte d’Ivoire, Communication No. 318/06, 17th Extraordinary
Session, 19-28 February 2015, para. 183 (emphasis added).
24 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois
Welfare Council) v. Kenya, Communication No. 276/03, 27th Activity Report, 25 November 2009, para.
294 (emphasis added).
25 Ibid., Art. 278.
26 Ibid., Arts. 87–92.
27 SERAC & CESR v. Nigeria, above n. 21.
28 Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, Communication No. 227/99,
20th Activity Report, 29 May 2003, para. 95; African Charter, above n. 13, Art. 21.
29 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force 29 November 1999, Art. 11 (right to
education); Art. 12 (leisure, recreation and cultural activities); Art. 14 (right to health); Art. 15 (protection
against child labour); Art. 18 (protection of the family); and Art. 21 (protection from harmful social and
cultural practices). See also Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) and Open
Society Justice Initiative on Behalf of Children of Nubian Descent in Kenya v. The Government of Kenya,
Decision No. 002/Com/002/2009, available at http://acerwc.org/?wpdmdl=8690 (African Committee of
Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 22 March 2011), para. 65.
30 See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa,
adopted by the Second Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, Maputo, 11 July 2003, entered into force
25 November 2005, available at http://www.au.int/en/treaties/protocol-african-charter-human-and-
peoples-rights-rights-women-africa, Arts. 12–17, 22–24.
31 See African Youth Charter, adopted by the AU Assembly in July 2006, entered into force 8 August
2009, available at http://www.au.int/en/treaties/african-youth-charter, Arts. 13–16, 20 and 25.
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and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons32; and the Protocol to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Older Persons in Africa.33
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (or any other court to replace it in
the future) will enforce ESC rights protected in the ICESCR since the Protocol to the
African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights empowers the African Court to consider ‘all cases and disputes submitted to it
concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter, this Protocol and any
other relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the States concerned’.34 This
means that the Court will interpret relevant provisions of the African Charter in light
of the provisions of any applicable international human rights instrument to which a
State is a party including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), the ICESCR and relevant jurisprudence of human rights bodies.35
More recently, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights has also
confirmed in the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Republic of
Kenya that by virtue of Articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter it will draw
inspiration from ‘other human rights instruments’ including the ICESCR and the
CESCR General Comments to interpret rights protected by the Charter.36 In this
case the Court found, inter alia, that the Republic of Kenya interfered with the
enjoyment of the right to culture of the Ogiek population by evicting them from the
Mau Forest in Kenya, thereby, restricting them from exercising their cultural
activities and practices, in violation of Article 17(2) and (3) of the African Charter.
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court specifically relied on the CESCR General
Comment 21 paragraphs 36–37 to interpret the right to take part in cultural life
under article 17 of the African Charter observing that:
32 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa
(Kampala Convention), adopted by the Special Summit of the AU held in Kampala, 22 October 2009,
entered into force 6 December 2012, available at http://www.au.int/en/treaties/african-union-convention-
protection-and-assistance-internally-displaced-persons-africa, Art. 3(b) requires States to ‘[p]revent
political, social, cultural and economic exclusion and marginalisation, that are likely to cause displace-
ment of populations or persons by virtue of their social identity, religion or political opinion’.
33 Adopted on 31 January 2016, http://www.au.int/en/treaties/protocol-african-charter-human-and-
peoples%E2%80%99-rights-rights-older-persons-africa, Arts. 6–17.
34 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, AU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III), adopted on 10
June 1998, entered into force 25 January 2004, Arts. 3 and 7. See also the Protocol on the Statute of the
African Court of Justice and Human Rights, adopted on 1 July 2008, available at http://www.au.int/en/
treaties/protocol-statute-african-court-justice-and-human-rights, Art. 28 (c).
35 See, e.g., In the Matter of Alex Thomas v. United Republic of Tanzania, Application No. 005/2013
(African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 12 November 2015), paras. 88, 95–98, 114–121, 124, 130,
146, and 158 in which the court relied on Art. 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR, decisions of the African
Commission, judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and Inter-American Court of Human
Rights as well as views of the Human Rights Committee. See also Wilfred Onyango Nganyi and 9 Others
v. United Republic of Tanzania, Application No. 006/2013 (African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
18 March 2016), available at http://en.african-court.org/images/Cases/Judgment/Onyango_Judgment.pdf,
paras. 165-179; In the Matter of Actions Pour La Protection Des Droits De L’Homme (APDH) v.
Republic of Cote D’ivoire, Application No. 001/2014 (African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 18
November 2016).
36 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Republic of Kenya, Application No. 006/2012
(African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Judgment of 26 May 2017), para. 108.
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The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in its General
Comment on Article 15(1) (a) also observed that ‘the strong communal
dimension of indigenous peoples’ cultural life is indispensable to their
existence, well-being and full-development, and includes the right to the lands,
territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or
otherwise used or acquired’.37
As a result, the Court accepted that the Ogiek population as Indigenous Peoples
had the right to occupy their ancestral lands in the Mau Forest, as well as the right to
use and enjoy the said lands. Given that approximately 50 million indigenous
peoples live across Africa and face high levels of economic, social and cultural
marginalisation,38 the African Court’s judgment relating to the Ogiek population
provides a good illustration of how litigation can support the legal empowerment of
marginalised groups such as indigenous peoples in Africa.
Similarly the Human and Peoples’ Rights Section of the African Court of Justice
and Human and Peoples Rights, which will replace the existing African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Rights after ratification of the Court’s Statute by 15 States,
shall be competent to hear ‘all cases relating to human and peoples’ rights’
including cases alleging violations of ESC rights.39 However, the limitation placed
on direct access to the Court by victims of human rights violations, namely
individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) will limit the Court’s
effectiveness.40 This is because direct access to the Court is limited to ‘individuals
or relevant NGOs accredited to the African Union or to its organs’ where a State
concerned has submitted an optional declaration accepting the competence of the
Court to receive cases from individuals and NGOs.41 It is important to note that
States have been reluctant to make such a declaration to accept the jurisdiction of
the existing African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights to receive cases of human
rights violations directly from individuals and NGOs. As at May 2017, only eight
(8) of the thirty (30) States parties to the Protocol to the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights had made the declaration recognising the competence of the Court
to receive cases from individuals and NGOs.42 The eight (8) States were Benin,
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Tanzania and Tunisia. Without
such a declaration, the Court manifestly lacks jurisdiction to receive cases from
37 Ibid., para. 181.
38 See International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs, http://www.iwgia.org/regions/africa.
39 See Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples Rights, adopted 27 June 2014, Art.
17(2), https://www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/treaties/7804-treaty-0045_-_protocol_on_amendments_
to_the_protocol_on_the_statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_human_rights_e.pdf.
40 Ibid., Art. 9(3).
41 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, adopted 1 July 2008, Art.
8(3); Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, adopted 1 July 2008, Art. 30(f).
42 See African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, http://www.african-court.org/en/. The 30 States
which had ratified the Protocol by May 2017 were: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Comoros, Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Lesotho, Mali, Malawi,
Mozambique, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nigeria, Niger, Rwanda, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, South
Africa, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia and Uganda.
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individuals and NGOs alleging violations of ESC rights against several States. This
limits the Court’s potential to develop ESC rights protection on the basis of relevant
human rights treaties including the ICESCR.
Furthermore, requests for the advisory opinions from NGOs are limited to ‘any
African organisation recognised by the AU’.43 This has been understood to refer to
African NGOs ‘with observer status before or a Memorandum of Understanding
with the African Union [AU]’.44 However, most human rights NGOs cannot obtain
such observer status before the AU because the ‘granting, suspension and
withdrawal of observer status of an NGO, are the prerogative of the African Union
and shall not be subject of adjudication in any Court of Law or tribunal’.45
Accordingly, NGOs not recognised by the Executive Council of the AU are not
entitled to bring requests for advisory opinions before the African Court. This is a
missed opportunity to request the Court’s advisory opinions on issues relevant to
ESC rights.
The African Charter, which entered into force on 21 October 1986, nearly
10 years after entry into force of the ICESCR, placed legally binding obligations on
State parties and obliged them to ‘recognize the rights, duties and freedoms’
enshrined in the Charter and ‘undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to
give effect to them’.46 This entails obligations to ‘respect’, ‘protect’ and ‘fulfil’ all
rights protected by the African Charter including ESC rights.47 Thus the Charter’s
preamble reaffirmed that:
civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and
cultural rights in their conception as well as universality and that the
satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the
enjoyment of civil and political rights.48
The African Commission has thus interpreted civil and political rights
broadly to include ESC rights. For example the right to life under article
4 of the African Charter49 has been understood to entail a ‘dignified
43 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, above n. 41, Art. 4(1).
44 See Request for Advisory Opinion by the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP),
No. 001/2013, Advisory Opinion, 26 May 2017, para. 64.
45 See Criteria for Granting Observer Status and for a System of Accreditation within the AU, EX.CL/
195 (VII) Annex V adopted by the 7th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council and Endorsed by the
5th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly held in Sirte, Libya, on 1-2 and 4-5 July 2005, respectively,
sect. V, 6.
46 African Charter, above n. 13, Art. 1.
47 See, e.g., Abdel Hadi, Ali Radi and Others v. Sudan, Communication No. 368/09, 5 November 2013,
para. 92: ‘The Commission considers that if a State Party fails to respect, protect, promote or fulfil any of
the rights guaranteed in the Charter, this constitutes a violation of Article 1 of African Charter’. See also
Social and Economic Rights Action Center and Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria,
Communication No. 155/96, 15th Annual Activity Report, (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001), paras.
44–47; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, Communication No. 245/2002, Annex III,
(2006) 21st Activity Report, (2006) AHRLR 128 (ACHPR 2006), para. 152.
48 African Charter, above n. 13, preamble, para. 8.
49 Ibid., Art. 4 reads: ‘Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his
life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right’.
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life’.50 This includes State obligations to take ‘preventive steps to preserve and
protect the natural environment and humanitarian responses to natural disasters,
famines, outbreaks of infectious diseases, or other emergencies’.51 In addition,
the Commission has interpreted the right to life to entail State obligations ‘to
address more chronic yet pervasive threats to life, for example with respect to
preventable maternal mortality, by establishing functioning health systems and
eliminating discriminatory laws and practices which impact on individuals’ and
groups’ ability to seek healthcare’.52 Thus, the Commission has noted that
violations of ESC rights may in certain circumstances also entail violations of
the right to life.53 It is crucially important to note that the African Commission
has strongly recommended that African States ‘harmonize’ domestic legislation
with ‘international human rights obligations’.54 Have African State parties to
the ICESCR harmonised their domestic laws with the ICESCR? The next
section examines the influence of the ICESCR on domestic legal regimes in
Africa with particular emphasis on the whether the Covenant has influenced the
constitutional protection of human rights.
3 Influence of the ICESCR on the Domestic Protection of Human Rights
in Africa
Although many African States are notoriously late submitting their reports to the
CESCR, it is crucial to note that the Committee has made several important
recommendations on the domestic implementation of ESC rights in several African
States.55 It is notable from these observations that a common issue of concern in
50 See African Commission, General Comment No. 3 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights: The Right to Life (Article 4) (November 2015), available at http://www.achpr.org/instruments/
general-comments-right-to-life/, paras. 3 and 43.
51 Ibid., at para. 41.
52 Ibid., at para. 42.
53 Ibid., at para. 43.
54 See, e.g., Groupe de Travail sur les Dossiers Judiciaires Stratégiques v. Democratic Republic of
Congo, Communication No. 259/2002 (2011), available at http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/14th-eo/
comunications/259.2002/achpr14eos_decision_259_02_eng.pdf, para. 92(i).
55 See, e.g., the following Concluding Observations of the CESCR on the following States: Algeria, UN
Docs. E/C.12/1995/17 (28 December 1995), E/C.12/1995/18 (7 October 1996) paras. 278-305, E/C.12/1/
Add.71 (30 November 2001), E/C.12/DZA/CO/4 (7 June 2010); Angola, UN Doc. E/C.12/AGO/CO/3 (1
December 2008); Benin, UN Docs. E/C.12/1/Add.78 (5 June 2002), E/C.12/BEN/CO/2 (9 June 2008);
Burundi, UN Doc. E/C.12/BDI/CO/1 (16 October 2015); Cameroon, UN Docs. E/C.12/1989/5 (1989)
paras. 53-78, E/C.12/CMR/CO/2-3 (23 January 2012); Chad, UN Doc. E/C.12/TCD/CO/3 (16 December
2009); Congo, UN Docs. E/C.12/1/Add.45 (23 May 2000), E/C.12/COG/CO/1 (2 January 2013);
Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Docs. E/C.12/1988/4 (1988) paras. 270-303, E/C.12/COD/CO/4
(16 December 2009); Djibouti, UN Doc. E/C.12/DJI/CO/1-2 (30 December 2013); Egypt, UN Docs.
E/C.12/1/Add.44 (23 May 2000), E/C.12/EGY/CO/2-4 (13 December 2013); Equatorial Guinea, UN Doc.
E/C.12/GNQ/CO/1 (13 December 2012); Ethiopia, UN Doc. E/C.12/ETH/CO/1-3 (31 May 2012); Gabon,
UN Doc. E/C.12/GAB/CO/1 (27 December 2013); Gambia, UN Doc. E/C.12/1994/9 (31 May 1994);
Guinea, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.5 (28 May 1996); Kenya, UN Docs. E/C.12/1993/6 (3 June 1993),
E/1995/22 (SUPP) (1995) paras. 159-164, E/C.12/KEN/CO/1 (1 December 2008), E/C.12/KEN/CO/2-5
(4 March 2016); Libya, UN Docs. E/1983/WG.1/SR.16 (3 May 1983), E/1983/WG.1/SR.17 (3 May
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Africa relates to the domestic application of the ICESCR. This section begins by
examining whether the rights protected in the ICESCR are part of domestic
constitutions in Africa followed by an evaluation of domestic approaches to the
application of the ICESCR in Africa, in States applying dualist and monist
approaches to international treaties in Africa.
3.1 Are the Rights Protected in the ICESCR Part of Domestic Constitutions
in Africa?
State parties to the ICESCR are obliged to ‘take steps’ to the maximum of ‘available
resources’, with a view to ‘achieving progressively’ the full realisation of the rights
recognised in the Covenant.56 This must be done by all ‘appropriate means,
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures’.57 While it is recognised
that the ICESCR ‘does not formally oblige States to incorporate its provisions in
domestic law’ and thus there is no obligation to adopt or incorporate the Covenant
in national constitution or other national laws, direct incorporation is highly
desirable since it ‘avoids problems that might arise in the translation of treaty
obligations into national law, and provides a basis for the direct invocation of the
Covenant rights by individuals in national courts’.58
Some African States have adopted constitutional provisions in the post-1990 era,
usually after becoming State parties to the ICESCR, according priority to the provisions
of international human rights treaties, including the ICESCR, over any inconsistent
domestic laws. For example, under Article 2(6) of Kenya’s 2010 Constitution: ‘Any
Footnote 55 continued
1983), E/C.12/1/Add.15 (20 May 1997), E/C.12/LYB/CO/2 (25 January 2006); Madagascar, UN Doc.
E/C.12/MDG/CO/2 (16 December 2009); Mali, UN Doc. E/C.12/1994/17 (21 December 1994); Mauri-
tania, UN Doc. E/C.12/MRT/CO/1 (10 December 2012); Mauritius, UN Doc. E/C.12/MUS/CO/4 (8 June
2010); Morocco, UN Docs. E/C.12/1994/5 (30 May 1994), E/1995/22 (SUPP) (1995) paras. 101-124,
E/C.12/1/Add.55 (1 December 2000), E/C.12/MAR/CO/3 (4 September 2006), E/C.12/MAR/CO/2 (4
September 2006), E/C.12/MAR/CO/4 (9 October 2015); Namibia, UN Doc. E/C.12/NAM/CO/1 (4 March
2016); Nigeria, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.23 (16 June 1998); Rwanda, UN Docs. E/1984/WG.1/SR.10 (27
April 1984), E/1984/WG.1/SR.12 (30 April 1984), E/C.12/1989/5 (1989) paras. 162-192, E/C.12/RWA/
CO/2-4 (10 June 2013); Senegal, UN Docs. E/1981/WG.1/SR.11 (11 September 1981), E/C.12/1993/18
(5 January 1994), E/C.12/1/Add.62 (24 September 2001); Sudan, UN Docs. E/C.12/1/Add.48 (1
September 2000), E/C.12/SDN/CO/2 (27 October 2015); Togo, UN Docs. E/C.12/1/Add.61 (21 May
2001), E/C.12/TGO/CO/1 (3 June 2013); Tunisia, UN Docs. E/1980/WG.1/SR.5 (18 April 1980), E/1980/
WG.1/SR.6 (21 April 1980), E/C.12/1/Add.36 (14 May 1999), E/C.12/TUN/CO/3 (14 November 2016);
Uganda, UN Doc. E/C.12/UGA/CO/1 (24 June 2015); United Republic of Tanzania, UN Docs. E/1980/
WG.1/SR.5 (18 April 1980), E/C.12/TZA/CO/1-3 (13 December 2012); Zambia, UN Docs. E/1986/
WG.1/SR.4 (18 April 1986), E/1986/WG.1/SR.5 (22 April 1986), E/1986/WG.1/SR.7 (23 April 1986),
E/C.12/1/Add.106 (23 June 2005); and Zimbabwe, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.12 (20 May 1997). The
CESCR Concluding Observations, are available at http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/
treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=9&DocTypeID=5.
56 ICESCR, above n. 1, Art. 2(1); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR),
General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, UN Doc. E/1991/23, annex III at 86
(1990); Mohamed Ben Djazia and Naouel Bellili (represented by Javier Rubio) v. Spain, Communication
No. 5/2015, E/C.12/61/D/5/2015 (20 June 2017).
57 Ibid.
58 CESCR, General Comment 9: The Domestic Application of the Covenant, UN Doc. E/C.12/1998/24
(3 December 1998) para. 8.
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treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya under this
Constitution’. AsKenya ratified the ICESCR, it is ‘part of’ domestic Kenyan law. Some
State constitutions affirm commitment to human rights enshrined in ‘all duly ratified
international conventions’ including the ICESCR without a detailed explicit Bill of
Rights.59 However, in practice the ICESCR ‘has never been invoked in court decisions,
even though it takes precedence over domestic law’.60 Other States have transformed
some rights protected in the Covenant into domestic law by supplementing or amending
existing national constitutions and ordinary legislation, without invoking the specific
terms of the Covenant. Due to weak parliamentary institutions in most of Africa overly
dependent on the executive, there is lack of domesticating legislation of international
human rights treaties including the ICESCR. Judges do not frequently rely on or
reference to the ICESCR in their judgments in national cases, and only in the rarest of
occasions do they refer to the jurisprudence (general comments, concluding observa-
tions, and views) of the CESCR.
As noted above, while the Committee has made several important recommen-
dations on the implementation of ESC rights in several African States,61 the
influence of these recommendations in Africa generally remains limited since most
of them remain unimplemented or unduly delayed. This is partly because of lack of
political will to comply with the recommendations of international (quasi)-judicial
bodies. For example, States have been reluctant to implement the recommendations
of the African Commission relating to ESC rights, such as the Commission’s
decision on the Endorois.62 This is worsened by the lack of effective follow-up with
the concluding observations and recommendations of the Committee concerning
previous reports. In addition, several African States still consider the Committee’s
recommendations to be ‘non-binding’ under international law. Consequently, States
have done very little to disseminate the Committee’s concluding observations
widely. Thus, most African victims of violations of ESC rights do not know of the
existence of the ICESCR. In addition, most African States regard most ESC rights
(particularly adequate housing, food, water and sanitation) as merely non-justiciable
‘directive principles’ of State policy (‘needs’ or ‘services’) rather than fully
justiciable human rights (‘entitlements’).63 Thus some national constitutions
59 See, e.g., the Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon (revised 2008), preamble.
60 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Cameroon, UN Doc. E/C.12/CMR/CO/2-3 (23 January 2012) para. 7.
61 See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the CESCR, above n. 55.
62 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Another on Behalf of the Endorois Welfare
Council v. Kenya, Communication No. 276/2003, 27th Activity Report, (2009) AHRLR 75 (ACHPR
2009); CESCR, Concluding Observations: Kenya, UN Doc. E/C.12/KEN/CO/2-5 (4 March 2016) paras.
15–16; Murray and Long (2015).
63 See, e.g., Constitutions of Nigeria (1999), Lesotho (1993), Sierra Leone (1991), Ghana (1992),
Ethiopia (1994), Uganda (1995) and the Gambia (1996). See also Khathang Tema Baitsokoli and Another
v. Maseru City Council and Others, Case (CIV) 4/05, CONST/C/1/2004 (Court of Appeal of Lesotho, 20
April 2004), (2004) AHRLR 195; Issa Iddi Abass & Others v. Accra Metropolitan Assembly and Anor,
Suit No. Misc 1203/2002 (Justice Yaw Appau, High Court of Ghana, Accra, 24 July 2002); New Patriotic
Party v. Attorney-General [1996–97] SCGLR 729 (Supreme Court of Ghana, Accra). But see Ghana
Lotto Operators Association & Others v. National Lottery Authority [2007–2008] 2 SCGLR 1088, at
1113, the Supreme Court of Ghana held that ‘a presumption of justiciability’ applies to all provisions of
the constitution including to ESC rights confined in the directive principles of State policy.
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relegate rights to health and education to non-justiciable ‘Principles of State
Policy’.64 Moreover, even a few States (Nigeria and Benin)65 which have expressly
given domestic effect to the African Charter66 still consider most ESC rights,
including the right to free and compulsory primary education, as non-justiciable
directive principles of State policy.67 As a result, domestic courts in several States
have been unwilling to enforce ESC rights claiming that they involve (non-
justiciable) questions of ‘a political nature’.68 This view has been rejected by the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Community Court of
Justice. In 2009 the Court held that although the right to education was recognised
as a non-justiciable ‘directive principle’ of State policy under section 6(6)(c) of
Nigeria’s Constitution 1999, the ECOWAS Community obligations undertaken by
Nigeria as a result of being a State party to the African Charter (and the ICESCR)
mean that the Court was obliged to apply all the rights protected in the African
Charter including Article 17 thereof which guarantees the right to education.69 Thus
the Court confirmed that the rights guaranteed by the African Charter are justiciable
before the ECOWAS Court.
As a matter of international law, every State party to a treaty without reservations
(including every State organ, e.g., judiciary, parliament, executive) is legally
obliged to perform its obligations in ‘good faith’.70 Thus, a State party to the
ICESCR may not invoke the provisions of its domestic law as ‘justification for its
failure to perform a treaty’.71 Rather a State which has contracted valid international
obligations, including those arising under the ICESCR, is ‘bound to make in its
64 Lesotho Constitution (1993), Arts. 27–28.
65 See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap 10, Laws
of the Federation of Nigeria 1990; and Constitution of the People’s Republic of Benin (1990), Art. 7.
66 Above n. 13.
67 See Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999), sects. 6(6)(c) and 18; Registered Trustees
of Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v. Federal Republic of Nigeria and
Universal Basic Education Commission, ECW/CCJ/APP/12/07, ECW/CCJ/JUD/07/10 (ECOWAS
Community Court, 30 November 2010); Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project v. Nigeria,
Communication No. 300/2005, 25th Activity Report, (2008) AHRLR 108 (ACHPR 2008), paras. 28, 29,
62–69.
68 See, e.g., Centre for Health, Human Rights and Development and 3 Others v. Attorney General,
Constitutional Petition No. 16 of 2011, [2012] UGCC 4 (Constitutional Court of Uganda, 5 June 2012),
http://www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/constitutional-court/2012/4. But see Centre for Health, Human Rights
and Development & 3 Others v. Attorney General, Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 2013 (Supreme Court
of Uganda, 30 October 2015) directing the Constitutional Court to hear the case on its merits before
deciding whether it raised a ‘political question’.
69 Registered Trustees of the Socio-economic Rights & Accountability Project (SERAP) v. The Federal
Republic of Nigeria and Universal Basic Education Commission, ECW/CCJ/APP/0808 (ECOWAS
Community Court, 27 October 2009), para. 19. Under Art. 4(g) of the Revised Treaty of ECOWAS,
http://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Revised-treaty.pdf, Member States of ECOWAS,
affirmed and declared their adherence to the ‘recognition, promotion and protection of human and
peoples’ rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’.
70 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679, Art. 26.
71 Ibid., Art. 27. The ICJ stated that Art. 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reflects
‘customary law’, which binds all States. See the Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or
Extradite case (Belgium v. Senegal), ICJ Reports 2012, p. 422, at p. 460.
The Influence of the ICESCR in Africa
123
legislation such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfilment of the
obligations undertaken’.72 The ICESCR does not specify the specific means by
which it is to be given effect or implemented in the national legal order.73 As a
result, every State enjoys a ‘margin of discretion’74 in adopting ‘all appropriate
means’ to comply with its obligations under the ICESCR. Nevertheless ‘legislative
measures’75 (e.g. legislation aimed at preventing violations of ESC rights, such as
prohibiting discrimination by non-State actors in the exercise of ESC rights both
domestically and, to the extent compatible with international law, extraterritorially;
repeal or reform of laws that nullify or impair certain individual’s and group’s right
to realise their ESC rights including sexual and reproductive health, legal
prohibition of harmful practices and legal prohibition of harassment at work)76
are in many instances ‘highly desirable’ and in some cases may even be
‘indispensable’.77 Such legislative measures should provide for appropriate means
of redress to aggrieved individuals or groups, or ‘accessible, affordable, timely and
effective’ remedies and to reparation (in the form of restitution, compensation,
rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantee of non-repetition) for victims of viola-
tions, preferably through courts, to ensure accountability.78
The ICESCR has influenced the legal protection of ESC rights in some African
States in several ways. First, it has been applied as a source of interpretation in some
court judgments. Second, it has influenced the content of ESC rights in national
constitutions.79 Third, it has specifically been referred to as a source of law in some
national constitutions and this has in turn influenced the adoption of some ordinary
legislation and policies essential to ESC rights. All African States have constitutions
containing provisions regulating the relation between international treaties and
national law and/or protecting human rights including the right to life, human
dignity, equality and non-discrimination, freedom from torture, inhuman and
degrading treatment, and some ESC rights.80 Although there is no uniform identical
approach to treaties in Africa, generally African States apply the ‘dualist’ or
72 See Exchange of Greek and Turkish Population case, Advisory Opinion (21 February 1925), PCIJ
Reports, Series B, No. 10, 20.
73 CESCR, General Comment 9, above n. 58, para. 5.
74 CESCR, General Comment 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of all
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/2005/4 (11 August 2005) para. 32.
75 ICESCR, above n. 1, Art. 2(1).
76 CESCR, General Comment 24 on State Obligations under the ICESCR in the Context of Business
Activities, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/24 (23 June 2017); CESCR, General Comment 23: The Right to Just and
Favourable Conditions of Work, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/23 (8 March 2016) paras. 50 and 65(e); CESCR,
General Comment 22: The Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/22 (4 March
2016) paras. 34 and 49(a) and (b).
77 CESCR, General Comment 3, above n. 56, para. 3.
78 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948), Art. 8;
CESCR, General Comment 9, above n. 58, paras. 2 and 9; Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to
a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, A/RES/60/147 (21 March 2005), Art. 3(a)–(d).
79 All African States have bills of rights in constitutions. See African Legal Centre, above n. 8; Chitimira
(2017).
80 African Legal Centre, above n. 8.
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‘monist’ approach to international treaties,81 following the practice to domestication
of international treaties applied by former colonial powers in Africa mainly Britain,
France and Portugal, though many constitutions embody both ‘dualist’ or ‘monist’
elements.
3.2 Dualist Approach to the ICESCR in Africa and Influence on Human
Rights
The influence of the ICESCR in African States applying a ‘dualist’ approach to
international treaties has depended on whether or not a particular State has adopted
relevant domestic law (constitutional provisions or ordinary legislation) to give
effect to its obligations under the Covenant. Generally dualist theoretical approach
to the relationship between international and national law takes the view that
international law regulates the relations between States whereas national law
regulates the rights and obligations of individuals within a State.82 In ‘dualist’
African States, mainly former colonies of the United Kingdom (UK) following the
constitutional law of the UK,83 the principle is generally that while ‘[t]he
Government may negotiate, conclude, construe, observe, breach, repudiate or
terminate a treaty’,84 such a treaty is not part of domestic law until it has been
incorporated by legislation.85 The dualist approach takes the view that international
courts apply international law while domestic courts are obliged to apply domestic
law and not international treaties, or at least that it is for the national court to decide
which rule to apply.86 Thus, international treaties such as the ICESCR, in whole or
in part, are not applicable in any national legal system (and thus not ordinarily
enforceable by the courts) unless they have been incorporated into national law
(through incorporation or reception) by legislation in force to give effect to them.87
The rationale for the dualist theory is to prevent the Executive from being able to
81 For a discussion of the relationship between international treaties and domestic law, see Aust (2013),
pp. 159-177; Crawford (2012), pp. 48–111; Shaw (2014), pp. 92–141; and Harris and Sivakumaran
(2015), pp. 59–84.
82 Crawford (2012), p. 48.
83 Dicey (1915). Former British colonies in Africa are: Botswana, Cameroon, the Gambia, Ghana,
Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
84 J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v. Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 2 AC 418 at 476.
85 Lord Oliver in Maclaine Watson v. Dept. of Trade [1990] 2 AC 418 at 500 (House of Lords) explained
that ‘a treaty is not part of English law unless and until it has been incorporated into the [domestic] law by
legislation’.
86 Crawford (2012), p. 48.
87 See, e.g., the Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland (2005), Sect. 238(4) provides that: ‘Unless it
is self-executing, an international agreement becomes law in Swaziland only when enacted into law by
Parliament’; Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, Sect. 231(4): ‘Any international
agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by national legislation; but a self-
executing provision of an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it
is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament’; Glenister v. President of the Republic of
South Africa and Others (CCT 48/10), [2011] ZACC 6 (17 March 2011), para. 92; Azanian Peoples
Organization (AZAPO) and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT 17/96),
[1996] ZACC 16, para. 26.
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create law without observing the domestic constitutional requirements necessary for
law making (i.e. to prevent law creation by the Executive without an Act of
Parliament).88 In such States applying a ‘dualist’ approach to the ICESCR, the
Covenant is applied by domestic courts as mediated by national legislation, and
national legislation will prevail, unless the issue can be resolved by interpretation.
This means that in ‘dualist’ States in Africa the rights protected under the ICESCR
and jurisprudence developed by the CESCR are generally regarded as not directly
enforceable unless incorporated into domestic law by legislation.
Furthermore, the influence of the Covenant has also depended on judicial attitude
to the application of international treaties by domestic courts. Although some
constitutions of ‘dualist’ States, such as Namibia, provide that ‘the general rules of
public international law and international agreements’ are binding and form part of
domestic law,89 domestic courts have shown unwillingness to invoke international
human rights treaties including the ICESCR.90 For example the Supreme Court of
Namibia stated in one case that an international treaty ratified by Namibia (in this
case the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women91) was ‘subject to the Constitution and cannot change the situation’92
relating to Namibia’s legislation, which discriminated on the basis of sex, in relation
to the right of male or female persons to assume the surname of the other spouse on
marriage.93 This led the UN Human Rights Committee to find a violation of the
right to equal protection of the law without any discrimination under Article 26 of
the ICCPR.94
By December 2016, although most African States applying a ‘dualist’ approach
to international treaties had adopted some policy and legislative measures
(constitutional provisions and/or ordinary domestic legislation) protecting some
aspects of ESC rights, they had not enacted domestic legislation to explicitly and
fully incorporate or give full effect to the ICESCR into national laws so as to
ensure the applicability of all Covenant rights in domestic courts.95 This non-
domestication approach also generally applied to other international and regional
human rights treaties. As noted above, Nigeria explicitly incorporated the African
88 See, e.g., Re McKerr [2004] UKHL 12, Lord Steyn; R v. Jones [2006] 2 WLR 772, Lord Bingham; R
(Bancoult) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2) [2009] AC 453, para. 44,
Lord Hoffmann; Dicey (1915), p. 38: Parliament has ‘the right to make or unmake any law whatsoever;
and further, no person or body is recognised by the law as having a right to override or set aside the
legislation of Parliament’.
89 Constitution of the Republic of Namibia (1990), Art. 144.
90 See CESCR, Concluding Observations: Namibia, UN Doc. E/C.12/NAM/CO/1 (4 March 2016) para.
6. See also Michael Andreas Müller and Imke Engelhard v. Namibia, Communication No. 919/2000, UN
Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/919/2000 (28 June 2002).
91 UN Doc. A/34/46; 1249 UNTS 13; 19 ILM 33 (1980), entered into force 3 September 1981.
92 Michael Andreas Muller v. President of Namibia, SA 2/98, [1999] NASC 2, 200 (6) BCLR 655
(Supreme Court of Namibia, 21 May 1999), http://www.saflii.org/na/cases/NASC/1999/2.html.
93 Section 9 of the Aliens Act No. 1 of 1937 as amended by Proclamation A.G. No. 15 of 1989.
94 Müller v. Namibia, above n. 90, para. 6.8.
95 See, e.g., CESCR, Concluding Observations: Uganda, UN Doc. E/C.12/UGA/CO/1 (24 June 2015)




Charter96 in Nigeria in 1990 by providing that the African Charter provisions
‘have force of law in Nigeria and shall be given full recognition and effect and be
applied by all authorities and persons exercising legislative, executive or judicial
powers in Nigeria’,97 more than 25 years later, it had not extended the same
treatment to the ICESCR. It remains unclear why the Nigerian authorities deemed
it ‘necessary and expedient’98 to incorporate the African Charter, thereby making
it possible for domestic courts to ‘apply’ directly the Charter and open to
individuals and groups to ‘resort to its [Charter’s] provisions to obtain redress in
our [Nigerian] domestic courts’,99 but this approach was not extended to the
ICESCR.
It is well-known that most ‘dualist’ African States adopted constitutions, as a
precondition to independence, with the Bill of Rights drawing heavily from the
[European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms,100 with exclusive protection of civil and political rights and the right to
property of nationals of the former colonial power.101 Thus, historically some
domestic courts in ‘dualist’ African States have referred to international treaties
protecting civil and political rights, such as the ICCPR rather than to the ICESCR,
when applying and interpreting relevant domestic law.102 Given increased attention
to the need to address widespread poverty, inequitable distribution of resources and
systematic or widespread violations of ESC rights (e.g. education, health, adequate
food, housing, water and sanitation) in many African States, several States adopted
new constitutions and other domestic legislation since 1990s protecting at least
some ESC rights particularly of vulnerable and marginalised groups103 influenced in
part by (though without explicitly making reference to) the ICESCR.
To date, in many African States, there have been no cases in which the ICESCR has
been applied before domestic courts. For this reason, there has been no ESC rights
jurisprudence to discuss in this article. However, domestic courts in Africa have
handed down significant judgments protecting some aspects of ESC rights. These
include cases involving reproductive and sexual rights104; the protection of pregnant
96 Above n. 13.
97 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, above n. 65, Art.
1.
98 Ibid., preamble.
99 Sanni Abacha and Others v. Gani Fawehinmi (2001) AHLRR 172, [2002] 3 LRC 296 (Supreme Court
of Nigeria, 28 April 2000), Ejiwunmi JSC.
100 213 UNTS 222, entered into force 3 September 1953.
101 See, e.g., Bills of Rights in the following Constitutions: Nigeria Constitution (1960); Uganda
Constitution (1962); Kenya Constitution (1969).
102 See, e.g., Ephraim v. Pastory, Civil Appeal No. 70 of 1989, (2001) AHRLR 236 (High Court of
Tanzania at Mwanza, 22 February 1990), para. 10; Kachingwe and Others v. Minister of Home Affairs
and Another [2005] ZWSC 134, (2005) AHRLR 288 (Zimbabwe Supreme Court, 18 July 2005) paras.
50–72.
103 Constitution of Kenya (2010), Art. 21(3); Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013), Arts. 63–65, 71–75, and
80–83; Constitution of Mozambique (2004), Arts. 82–95; Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles
(1993), Arts. 26–39; Constitution of Malawi (1994), sect. 30.
104 See generally Kangaude (2017).
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school girls and women in higher education against discrimination in education105;
protection of individuals from sterilization on account of their Human Immunode-
ficiency Virus (HIV) positive status (by way of a surgical procedure or operation
known as bilateral tubal ligation) without informed consent106; and the right to
maternal, child and reproductive health by awarding damages due to the failure to
provide pregnant women with ‘the timely, immediate and emergency obstetric
care’.107 Despite these developments, most domestic courts in Africa do not always
take into account the ICESCR when interpreting and applying domestic law. For
example, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland 2005 in section 29(6) of the
Constitution protects the right to free primary education by providing that:
Every Swazi child shall within three years of the commencement of this
Constitution have the right to free education in public schools at least up to the
end of primary school, beginning with the first grade.
The Supreme Court of Swaziland, contrary to the ICESCR,108 held that the right
to education including primary education could only be progressively realised
subject to the availability of resources.109 Thus schools continued to levy
compulsory parental contribution (indirect costs) for primary education, such as
payment for school uniforms, which restrict access to primary education for children
from families with high levels of poverty, particularly for girls.
However, some domestic courts in Africa have relied on provisions of the
ICESCR and other regional and international human rights instruments110 to
105 See, e.g., Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v. Welkom High School
and Another; Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v. Harmony High
School and Another (CCT 103/12), [2013] ZACC 25, (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 10 July
2013), http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2013/25.html; Student Representative Council of Molepolole
College of Education v. Attorney General [1995] (3) LRC 447 (Botswana Court of Appeal, 31 January
1995); Lloyd Chaduka and Morgenster College v. Enita Mandizvidza, Judgment No. SC 114/2001, Civil
Appeal No. 298/2000 (Zimbabwe Supreme Court).
106 Government of the Republic of Namibia v. LM and Others (SA 49/2012), [2014] NASC 19 (3
November 2014), http://www.saflii.org/na/cases/NASC/2014/19.html; Legal and Ethical Network on HIV
& AIDS (KELIN) & 3 Others v. Cabinet Secretary Ministry of Health & 4 Others, Petition No. 250 of
2015, [2016] eKLR (High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, 7 December 2016), http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/
cases/view/132167/.
107 See, e.g., The Center for Health Human Rights and Development and 4 Others v. Nakaseke District
Local Administration, Civil Suit No. 111 of 2012 (High Court of Uganda, Kampala, 30 April 2015).
108 The minimum core obligation of the State includes the obligation to provide primary education which is
‘compulsory’ and ‘available free to all’. See ICESCR, Art. 13(2)(a); CESCR, General Comment 11: Plans of
Action for Primary Education, UNDoc. E/C.12/1999/4 (10May 1999) paras. 6-7; CESCR,General Comment
13: The Right to Education, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (8 December 1999) para. 57; CESCR, Concluding
Observations: Cameroon, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.40 (8 December 1999) paras. 27 and 47; CEDAW,
Concluding Observations: Swaziland, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/SWZ/CO/1-2 (24 July 2014) paras. 30–31.
109 Swaziland National Ex-Miners Workers Association v. The Minister of Education & Others, Civil
Appeal Case No. 2/10, [2010] SZSC 35 (Supreme Court of Swaziland, 28 May 2010), http://www.
swazilii.org/sz/judgment/supreme-court/2010/35, paras. 16–21.
110 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948), Art. 26; Convention on the
Rights of the Child, 28 ILM 1456 (1989), 1577 UNTS 3, Art. 28(1)(a) and (b) and 29(1); African Charter,
above n. 13, Art. 17; African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/
49 (1990), Art. 11(2) and (3).
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interpret and apply relevant domestic law even before ratification of the ICESCR.111
For example, the Covenant has specifically been referred to as a source of
interpretation in court judgments in Kenya ‘for the purpose of removing ambiguity
or uncertainty from national constitutions, legislation or common law’.112 This
general approach involving the use of international treaties to interpret ambiguous
domestic law has also been used by other domestic courts in Africa. Thus, in August
2015 the Supreme Court of Uganda relied on the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women113 to interpret Article 33(6) of
Uganda’s Constitution 1995 which prohibit ‘laws, cultures, customs or traditions
which are against the dignity, welfare or interest of women or which undermine
their status’.114
It is particularly instructive to note that domestic courts in South Africa and
Kenya have adjudicated significant cases on ESC rights. As such, they provide good
African examples on the influence of the ICESCR in Africa. Although South Africa
ratified the ICESCR on 12 January 2015, it signed the Covenant on 3 October 1994.
As a signatory for nearly 21 years (before ratification), its obligation to ‘refrain from
acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty’115 influenced the
protection of human rights in the South African Constitution 1996, which
entrenches both civil and political rights and ESC rights (e.g. right of ‘everyone’
to have access to adequate housing116; access to health care services, sufficient food
and water and social security117; and right to education118) as ‘inter-related and
mutually supporting’.119 The Constitution contains two important international law-
friendly interpretive provisions. First, it provides that, in interpreting the bill of
rights, courts or tribunals ‘must consider international law’.120 While this provision
111 See, e.g., Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School & Others v. Essay NO & Others
(Centre for Child Law & Another as Amici Curiae) [2011] ZACC 13, 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC), paras.
40-43; Attorney General v. Unity Dow (2001) AHRLR 99 (Court of Appeal, Botswana, 3 July1992),
paras. 106-109, referred to Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 2 and African Charter, above n.
13, Art. 2.
112 See, e.g., Republic v. Minister for Home Affairs & 2 Others Ex Parte Sitamze, Misc Civil Case No.
1652 of 2004, [2008] eKLR, (High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, 18 April 2008), http://kenyalaw.org/
Downloads_FreeCases/2007_Immigration_decision.pdf. The Court extensively relied on the ICESCR,
Arts. 6 and 2, to interpret the right of a non-national to work in Kenya. See also Mary Rono v. Jane and
William Rono, Civil Appeal No. 66 of 2002, (2005) AHRLR 107 (Court of Appeal at Eldoret, 29 April
2005), paras. 19–24.
113 UN Doc. A/34/46; 1249 UNTS 13; 19 ILM 33 (1980), Arts. 2(f), 16(1)(b) and (c).
114 See Mifumi (U) ltd and Others v. Attorney General and Kenneth Kakuru, Constitutional Appeal No.
02 of 2014, (Supreme Court of Uganda, Judgment of Hon Dr Esther Kisaakye, JSC, 6 August 2015)
noting on pp. 59–60 of the typed judgment that: ‘Uganda is a signatory [State party] to all major human
rights Conventions [including the ICESCR] which require it to put in place laws and measures that
prevent discrimination and perpetuate inequality’.
115 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, above n. 70, Art. 18.
116 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), sect. 26.
117 Ibid., sect. 27.
118 Ibid., sect. 29.
119 See Government of the Republic of South Africa & Others v. Grootboom & Others [2000] ZACC 19,
2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), para. 23.
120 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), sect. 39(1)(b), emphasis added.
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indicates possibilities open to South African courts to use international law (treaties
and jurisprudence of relevant international tribunals/bodies), the obligation, not a
choice, is to simply ‘consider’ and not to apply international law. Second, the
Constitution provides that ‘when interpreting any legislation, every court must
prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with
international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with
international law’.121 This applies to interpretation of ‘any legislation’ even in the
absence of any ambiguity. On the basis of the relevant constitutional provisions, the
South African Constitutional Court has developed useful jurisprudence on the
justiciability of ESC rights (based on the model of reasonableness review) with
particular reference to the rights of access to health care, adequate housing, water,
electricity, basic sanitation and education.122
It is evident from the Court’s jurisprudence that the Constitution has been
interpreted as imposing ‘at very least a negative obligation […] upon the State and
all other entities and persons to desist from preventing or impairing the right of
access’ to ESC rights such as access to adequate housing123 or right to a basic
education124; and positive State obligations to protect and fulfil ESC rights. The
constitutional positive obligations imposed upon government with respect to ESC
rights will be enforced by courts in at least the following ways: First, if the
government fails to take steps to ensure that ESC rights are progressively realised,
‘the courts will require government to take steps’.125 Second, if steps or measures
taken by the government are unreasonable (e.g. by failing to provide for those most
desperately in need), the courts will ‘require that they be reviewed so as to meet the
constitutional standard of reasonableness’.126 Third, if government adopts a policy
with unreasonable limitations or exclusions, the court may order that those
unreasonable limitations or exclusions ‘are removed’.127
While the Court’s jurisprudence shows how the State and specific aspects of
public policy can be held accountable for failure to respect, protect and fulfil ESC
rights via a constitutional culture of justification and accountability through
litigation, it has signalled that the Court does not intend to adopt and apply the
notion developed by the CESCR that ESC rights contained a minimum core (or
121 Ibid., sect. 233.
122 See, e.g., Thiagraj Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC), 1997
(12) BCLR 1696 (CC) (Soobramoney); Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v.
Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (Grootboom); Minister of
Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC), 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC)
(Treatment Action Campaign ); Khosa and Others v. Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505
(CC), 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) (Khosa); Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement SA and Another v. Premier
of the Province of Kwazulu-Natal and Others (CCT12/09), [2009] ZACC 31, 2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC);
Mazibuko and Others v. City of Johannesburg and Others (CCT 39/09), [2009] ZACC 28, 2010 (3)
BCLR 239 (CC); City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v. Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty)
Ltd and Another (CC) [2011] ZACC 33, 2012 (2) BCLR 150 (CC); and Juma Musjid, above n. 111.
123 Grootboom, above n. 122, para. 34.
124 Juma Musjid, above n. 111, para. 58.





‘minimum essential levels’) which the State is obliged to ensure.128 The
Committee’s minimum core approach, recently reaffirmed in two General
Comments adopted in March 2016,129 has thus not been applied by the South
African Constitutional Court. Instead the Court has preferred a high level of
deference to the legislature and executive. In Grootboom and Treatment Action
Campaign, the South African Constitutional Court explicitly rejected the argument
based on the CESCR General Comments 3 and 14 that ESC rights protected under
sections 26–27 of the South African Constitution 1996 (right to have ‘access’ to
adequate housing; healthcare; sufficient food and water; and social security)
imposed a minimum core obligation on the State. The Court held that sections 26
and 27 did not entitle anyone to the direct provision of minimum essential levels of
the relevant goods and services from the State.130 According to the Court:
It is impossible to give everyone access even to a ‘core’ service immediately.
All that is possible, and all that can be expected of the state, is that it
act[s] reasonably to provide access to the socio-economic rights identified in
sections 26 and 27 on a progressive basis.131
Thus in Mazibuko case, the applicants alleged, inter alia, that a Free Basic Water
policy to supply 6 kilolitres of freewater permonth to every account holder (regardless
of household size) in the City of Johannesburg violated the right to have access to
‘sufficient water’ under sections 27 of the South African Constitution 1996.132 The
Constitutional Court had to consider whether the City of Johannesburg’s Free Basic
Water policy was ‘reasonable’ in terms of section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution, which
guarantees everyone’s right of access to sufficient water. The applicants contended,
inter alia, that the Court should determine a quantified amount of water as ‘sufficient
water’ within the meaning of section 27 of the Constitution and that this amount is 50
litres per person per day.133 The Court (contrary to judgments in the High
128 CESCR, General Comment 3, above n. 56, para. 10: ‘…Committee is of the view that a minimum
core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the
rights is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant
number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter
and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations
under the Covenant…’.
129 CESCR, General Comment 22, above n. 76, para. 49; and CESCR, General Comment 23, above n.
97, para. 65.
130 Grootboom, above n. 122, paras. 23-33; Treatment Action Campaign, above n. 122, paras. 26–39.
131 Treatment Action Campaign, above n. 122, para. 35.
132 Sect. 27 provides: ‘(1) Everyone has the right to have access to –
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care;
(b) sufficient food and water; and
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents,
appropriate social assistance.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to
achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment’.
133 Mazibuko and Others v. City of Johannesburg and Others (CCT 39/09), [2009] ZACC 28, paras.
44(a) and 51.
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Court134 and Supreme Court of Appeal135) refrained from defining the minimum core
content of the right of access to ‘sufficient water’ under section 27(1)(b) of the
Constitution and held that the ‘applicants have not persuaded this Court to specify
what quantity of water is ‘‘sufficient water’’ within the meaning of section 27 of the
Constitution’.136 According to the Court the right to ‘sufficient water’ does not require
the State upon demand to provide every person with sufficient water without more but
rather ‘it requires the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures
progressively to realise the achievement of the right of access to sufficient water,
within available resources’.137 Without giving contextual meaning to the constitu-
tional standard of ‘reasonableness’ and the minimum core content of the right to
‘sufficientwater’, theCourt found theCity’s FreeBasicWater policy to fall ‘within the
bounds of reasonableness’. According to the Court:
ordinarily it is institutionally inappropriate for a court to determine precisely
what the achievement of any particular social and economic right entails and
what steps government should take to ensure the progressive realisation of the
right. This is a matter, in the first place, for the legislature and executive, the
institutions of government best placed to investigate social conditions in the
light of available budgets and to determine what targets are achievable in
relation to social and economic rights. Indeed, it is desirable as a matter of
democratic accountability that they should do so for it is their programmes and
promises that are subjected to democratic popular choice.138
Therefore, the ‘reasonableness’ review for assessing State compliance with ESC
rights obligations has been applied to allow the government a wide margin of
discretion to, inter alia, determine ‘what the achievement of any particular social
and economic right entails’. Consequently, the normative content core content of the
right to ‘sufficient water’ remained ambiguous. This means that there is no clear
guidance regarding State obligations and entitlements for individuals and groups.
The influence of the ICESCR in South African can also be discerned from the
constitutional protection of the right to education and how this right has been
enforced by courts. In 2011 (before ratification of the ICESCR by South Africa on
18 January 2015, which entered into force for South Africa on 12 April 2015) in the
case of Juma Musjid139 the Constitutional Court of South Africa relied on Articles
13 and 14 of the ICESCR to interpret and apply section 29(1)(a) of the Constitution
of South Africa protecting the right to education as follows:
Everyone has the right –
(a) to a basic education, including adult basic education; and
134 Mazibuko and Others v. City of Johannesburg and Others (06/13865), [2008] 4 All SA 471, (W) (30
April 2008), Tsoka J (holding that a basic minimum of 50 litres per person per day should be provided).
135 City of Johannesburg and Others v. Mazibuko and Others (489/08), [2009] 3 All SA 202 (SCA) (25
March 2009) (holding that a basic minimum of 42 litres per person per day should be provided).
136 Mazibuko and Others v. City of Johannesburg and Others (CCT 39/09), [2009] ZACC 28, para. 159.
137 Ibid., para. 50.
138 Ibid., para. 61, O’Regan J.
139 Juma Musjid, above n. 111.
M. Ssenyonjo
123
(b) to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must
make progressively available and accessible.140
The Court held that unlike some of the other ‘socio-economic rights’ under the
South African Constitution,141 the right to a basic education under Article
29(1)(a) is ‘immediately realisable’ since there is no internal limitation requiring
that the right be ‘progressively realised’ within ‘available resources’ subject to
‘reasonable legislative measures’.142 The Court distinguished the right to a ‘basic
education’ from the right to ‘further education’ provided for in section 29(1)(b),
which oblige the State through reasonable measures, to make further education
‘progressively available and accessible’.143 The Court further relied on CESCR
General Comment 13 to stress the importance of the right to education144 and
concluded that:
Indeed, basic education is an important socio-economic right directed, among
other things, at promoting and developing a child’s personality, talents and
mental and physical abilities to his or her fullest potential.[145] Basic education
also provides a foundation for a child’s lifetime learning and work
opportunities. To this end, access to school—an important component of the
right to a basic education guaranteed to everyone by section 29(1)(a) of the
Constitution—is a necessary condition for the achievement of this right.146
The South African example of constitutional protection of justiciable ESC rights
and judicial enforcement of these rights has been followed in other African States in
particular in Kenya.147 It also demonstrated that judicial or quasi-judicial bodies can
consider and determine claims submitted by or on behalf of individuals or groups of
individuals, claiming to be victims of a violation of any of the ESC right protected
in the ICESCR. This partly influenced the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the
ICESCR which provides for the competence of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights to receive and consider communications by or on behalf of
individuals or groups of individuals. This would in turn contribute to the
development of international jurisprudence on ESC rights.
140 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), sect. 29(1).
141 Ibid., Arts. 26(1) and 27. The right to have access to adequate housing under sect. 26(1) of the
Constitution and the right to have access to health care services, sufficient food and water, and social
security under sect. 27 of the Constitution. These rights are subject to an internal limitation that the State
must take reasonable legislative measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive
realisation of the right.
142 Juma Musjid, above n. 111, para. 37. See also Minister of Basic Education v. Basic Education for All
(20793/2014), [2015] ZASCA 198 (Supreme Court of Appeal, 2 December 2015).
143 Juma Musjid, above n. 111, para. 37.
144 CESCR, General Comment 13: The Right to Education, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (8 December 1999)
para. 1.
145 The court cited the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 29(1).
146 Juma Musjid, above n. 111, para. 43.
147 See Constitution of Kenya (2010), Arts. 43–44, 53. Under Art. 165(3)(b) the High Court is
empowered to ‘determine the question whether a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights has
been denied, violated, infringed or threatened’.
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Influenced by the ICESCR, the Constitution of Kenya 2010 protected what used
to be considered solely as ‘needs’ and ‘services’ as fully justiciable entitlements at
par with civil and political rights.148 The Constitution guarantees every person a
right to the highest attainable standard of health, accessible and adequate housing,
reasonable standards of sanitation, freedom from hunger, adequate food of
acceptable quality, clean and safe water in adequate quantities, social security
and education.149 The State is obliged to ‘observe, respect, protect, promote and
fulfil’ all rights in the Bill of Rights and to ‘take legislative, policy and other
measures, including the setting of standards, to achieve the progressive realisation
of the rights guaranteed under Article 43’,150 subject to available resources.151 This
provides a strong legal basis for courts to consider whether the measures or policies
taken by the State or any State organ, if any, with respect to ESC rights (e.g. access
to healthcare, housing, food, water and sanitation) meet the constitutional
standards.152 In several cases the High Court has applied the standard of whether
or not policies or measures in issue are ‘reasonable in the circumstances’.153 Since
the adoption of Kenya’s 2010 Constitution, domestic courts in Kenya have
increasingly relied directly on the ICESCR and General Comments of the CESCR to
interpret ESC rights protected in Kenya’s Constitution.154 For example, the Court
has relied directly on Article 12 ICESCR and the CESCR General Comment 14 (on
the right to health) and General Comment 17 (on the right of Everyone to benefit
from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific,
148 Michael Mutinda Mutemi v. Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education & 2 Others, Petition No.
133 of 2013, [2013] eKLR (High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, 1 November 2013), http://kenyalaw.org/
caselaw/cases/view/91830/, para. 13.
149 Constitution of Kenya (2010), Art. 43.
150 Ibid., Arts. 21(1) and (2). In Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v. Attorney General & 2 Others, Petition No.
164 of 2011, [2013] eKLR (High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, 11 April 2013), http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/
cases/view/87948, para. 53. Judge Mumbi Ngugi held that ‘progressive realisation’ implies that ‘the state
must begin to take steps, and I might add be seen to take steps, towards realization of these rights’,
emphasis in the original.
151 Constitution of Kenya (2010), Art. 43(5); ICESCR, above n. 1, Art. 2(1).
152 See, e.g., Mathew Okwanda v. Minister of Health and Medical Services & 3 Others, Petition No. 94
of 2012, [2013] eKLR (High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, 17 May 2013), http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/
cases/view/88803, para. 24; Kenya Society for the Mentally Handicapped v. Attorney General and 7
Others, Petition No. 155A of 2011, [2012] eKLR (High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, 18 December 2012),
http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/86061, para. 18.
153 See, e.g., Luco Njagi & 21 Others v. Ministry of Health & 2 Others, Petition No. 218 of 2013, [2015]
eKLR (High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, 28 January 2015), http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/
105546/, paras. 85 and 90 concluding that ‘the measures taken by the respondents to ensure access to
haemodialysis by the petitioner are reasonable in the circumstances’ due to limited available resources.
See also Consumer Federation of Kenya (COFEK) v. Attorney General & 4 Others, Petition No. 88 of
2011, [2012] eKLR, http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/82947, para. 39.
154 See, e.g., John Kabui Mwai & 3 Others v. Kenya National Examination Council & 2 Others, Petition
No. 15 of 2011, [2011] eKLR (High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, 16 September 2011), http://kenyalaw.org/
Downloads_FreeCases/83548.pdf, 6–7, the Court directly relied on Arts. 13 and 14 of the ICESCR after
observing that under Art. 2(6) of Kenya’s Constitution (2010) the ICESCR ‘forms part of our [Kenya]
laws’ since Kenya is a State party to the Covenant. See also P.A.O. & 2 Others v. Attorney General,
Petition No. 409 of 2009, [2012] eKLR (High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, 20 April 2012), http://kenyalaw.
org/Downloads_FreeCases/85611.pdf, paras. 58–64, 86; Luco Njagi, above n. 153, paras. 63–64.
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literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author) to interpret the scope
of the right to health in Kenya.155
3.3 Monist Approach to the ICESCR in Africa and Influence on Human
Rights
Monism emphasises that national and international law form one single legal order,
or at least a number of interlocking orders which should be presumed to be coherent
and consistent.156 Accordingly in States applying monism to international treaties, a
treaty such as the ICESCR may, without legislation, become part of domestic law
and can be applied directly within the national legal order once it has been
concluded in accordance with the constitution and has entered into force for the
State.157 Nevertheless, in practice, legal institutions of a ‘monist’ State, such as its
legislature and judiciary, should ensure that national law conforms to international
law and that international law can be relied on in national courts. In cases of
conflict, national courts should give effect to international law. In ‘monist’ African
States (following the civil law tradition based on the Constitution of France
1958)158 international treaties in force for the State can be applied directly within
the national legal order, without legislation. Some constitutions of a number of
‘Francophone’159 and ‘Lusophone’160 African States expressly provide (in the
Preamble or other parts of the Constitution) that duly signed and ratified treaties in
accordance with constitutional processes are part of or take precedence over
national legislation, or that human rights protected in the Constitution shall be
interpreted in harmony with the relevant international instruments.161 Treaties in
such States are, in theory, superior to (supersede) ordinary legislation but subject to
155 Patricia Asero Ochieng and 2 Others v. The Attorney General & AIDS Law Project, Petition No. 409
of 2009 (High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, 20 April 2012), paras. 57–64.
156 Crawford (2012), p. 48.
157 Aust (2013), p. 163.
158 The Constitution of France (1958), Art. 55: ‘Treaties or agreements duly ratified or approved shall,
upon publication, prevail over Acts of Parliament, subject, with respect to each agreement or treaty, to its
application by the other party’.
159 See Constitutions of the following former French colonies in Africa: Algeria (1989), Art. 132; Benin
(1990) preamble and Art. 147; Burkina Faso (1991), preamble; Burundi (2004), Art. 292; Cameroon
(1996), Art. 45; Central African Republic (1995), preamble; Chad (1996), preamble and Art. 221; DRC
(2005), Art. 215; Congo (2001), Art. 184; Guinea (1990), preamble; Madagascar (1992), preamble; Mali
(1992), preamble and Art. 116; Niger (1999), preamble and Art. 132; Rwanda, Art. 190; Senegal (2001),
Art. 98; Seychelles (1993), Art. 48; Togo (1992), preamble; and Tunisia (2014), Art. 20.
160 See Constitutions of the following six former colonies of the Portuguese Empire in Africa: Angola
(2010), Art. 13; Cape Verde (1992), Art. 11; Guinea-Bissau (1984), Art. 28; Mozambique (2004), Art. 18;
São Tomé and Prı́ncipe (1975), Arts. 12 and 17 and Equatorial Guinea (1991), preamble and Art. 14.
161 See, e.g., Constitution of São Tomé and Prı́ncipe (1975), Arts. 12 and 17; Equatorial Guinea (1991),
preamble and Art. 14; Guinea-Bissau (1984), Art. 28; and Constitution of Mozambique (2004), Art. 43:
‘The constitutional principles in respect of fundamental rights shall be interpreted and integrated in
harmony with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with the African Charter of Human and
Peoples’ Rights’.
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the Constitution.162 However, in practice ‘monist’ States in Africa require
international treaties to be officially published before becoming part of domestic
law.163 Courts may also need to determine the extent to which rights protected by
the ICESCR are ‘justiciable’ or ‘self-executing’, that is may be directly applied by
courts without further specification or definition by the legislature. Thus,
enforcement of the ICESCR in ‘monist’ African States may require a State to
‘take prior legislative measures’ to make provisions of the ICESCR applicable in
domestic law.164 It must be acknowledged that generally most courts in ‘monist’
African States have not given full effect to the provisions of the ICESCR in the
domestic legal order, especially by providing for judicial and other remedies for
violations of ESC rights.165 As a result, the influence of the ICESCR on domestic
legislation, policies and national courts jurisprudence in most ‘monist’ African
States has been very limited partly because historically judicial training has not paid
adequate attention to international human rights including the justiciability of ESC
rights.166 In this context, the ICESCR has not been used as a source of directly
enforceable rights or a source of inspiration in the interpretation of relevant
domestic law in court judgments as judges tend to rely on domestic legislation
(which is inadequate to implement the rights guaranteed under the ICESCR) with
which they are more familiar.167 Therefore, it is imperative to ensure that national
human rights institutions do not concentrate solely on civil and political rights, but
accord equal weight and attention to ESC rights.
For example, the Constitution of Rwanda 2003 protects several ESC rights
including rights to free choice of employment, equal pay for equal work, form trade
unions, strike, education and health.168 It further provides that international treaties
and agreements have precedence over domestic laws169 and thus can be applied
162 See, e.g., Constitution of Central African Republic (2013), Art. 97: ‘Agreements or Treaties properly
ratified or approved, take precedence, once published, over laws, on the condition, for each Agreement or
Treaty, of its application by the other parties’. See also Constitution of Cape Verde (1992), Art. 11 and
Constitution of Tunisia (2014), Art. 20.
163 See, e.g., Constitution of Senegal (2001), Art. 98: ‘Treaties or agreements duly ratified shall, upon
their publication, have an authority superior to that of the laws, subject, for each treaty and agreement, to
its application by the other party’ (emphasis added). See also Constitutions of Angola (2010), Art. 13(1)
and Benin (1990), Art. 147.
164 See Souleymane Guengueng and Others v. Hissène Habré (2002) AHRLR 183, para. 38 (Senegal
Court of Cassation, 20 March 2001).
165 See Cateme Community v. State of Mozambique, Judgment No. 15/TAPT/14, Process No. 04/2014,
the Administrative Court of Tete Province, 4 June 2014; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Democratic
Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. E/C.12/COD/CO/4 (16 December 2009) para. 8; Tunisia, UN Doc.
E/C.12/TUN/CO/3 (14 November 2016) para. 6.
166 USAID (2013), p. 28.
167 See, e.g., Case No. 501 of 27 July 1984, Dakar Court of Appeal, Senegal. Although the case raised an
issue concerning the right of access to good quality public health facilities, it was determined on the basis
of relevant domestic law (Art. 142 of the Code of the Obligations of the Administration, Act No. 65–61 of
19 July 1965) without any reference to Art. 12 ICESCR.
168 Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda (2003), Arts. 37–41.
169 Ibid., Art. 190 provides: ‘Upon their publication in the official gazette, international treaties and
agreements which have been conclusively adopted in accordance with the provisions of law shall be more
binding than organic laws and ordinary laws except in the case of non-compliance by one of the parties’.
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directly in the domestic legal order. In addition, it reaffirms ‘adherence to the
principles of human rights’ enshrined in various treaties, namely:
the United Nations Charter of 26 June 1945, the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948, the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 21
December 1965, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 19
December 1966, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights of 19 December 1966, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Discrimination against Women of 1 May 1980, the African Charter of
Human and Peoples’ Rights of 27 June 1981 and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child of 20 November 1989.170
However, the influence of the ICESCR in Rwanda has been limited by the
absence of cases of invocation before, or direct or indirect application of the
Covenant by, domestic courts or tribunals.171 This is also true in other in African
States giving primacy to international treaties, or making ratified international
treaties part of domestic law,172 or providing that the Bill of Rights ‘shall be
interpreted in such a way as not to be inconsistent with any international
obligations’173 including human rights obligations under the ICESCR.
For example, Article 132 of the Constitution of the People’s Democratic
Republic of Algeria 1989 (amended by the constitutional revision of 1996)174
provides: ‘Treaties ratified by the President of the Republic in accordance with the
conditions provided for by the Constitution are superior to [national] law’. Despite
the superiority of the Covenant in Algeria, in 2010 the CESCR was concerned that
there was ‘an absence of jurisprudence invoking the Covenant provisions, despite
the primacy of the Covenant over national law established by article 132 of the
Constitution’.175 The Committee recommended that Algeria ‘take effective
measures to increase awareness of Covenant rights among the judiciary and the
public at large, and to ensure that judicial training take full account of the
justiciability of Covenant rights’.176 To date jurisprudence invoking the ICESCR is
still non-existent.
170 Ibid., preamble para. 9 (emphasis added).
171 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Rwanda, UN Doc. E/C.12/RWA/CO/2-4 (10 June 2013) para. 6.
172 See, e.g., Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1994), Art. 9(4), which
provides: ‘All international agreements ratified by Ethiopia are an integral part of the law of the land’. See
also the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia (1990, as amended), Art. 144; CESCR, Concluding
Observations: Ethiopia, UN Doc. E/C.12/ETH/CO/1-3 (31 May 2012) para. 5.
173 Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles (approved on 18 June 1993, amended by Act No. 14 of
1996), Art. 48. Seychelles acceded to the ICESCR on 5 May 1992 but had not submitted even a single
report to the CESCR by June 2016, more than 23 years after accession.
174 Constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria (adopted on 28 November 1996,
amended in 2002 and 2008), http://www.algerianembassy.org.uk/index.php/constitution.html.
175 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Algeria, UN Doc. E/C.12/DZA/CO/4 (7 June 2010) para. 5.
176 Ibid.
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The observation above (failure to the invoke the ICESCR before or apply it by
national courts) and the recommendation above (direct applicability of the ICESCR
by promoting it, inter alia, among judges and the general population at large) appear
in several other CESCR concluding observations on African State reports,177 as
most recently exemplified by the following observations with respect to Burundi:
5. The Committee finds it regrettable that, despite the constitutional standing
of the Covenant, its provisions have never been invoked before or applied by
national courts.
6. The Committee recommends that the State party ensure the direct
applicability of the Covenant by promoting among judges, attorneys, public
officials and other officials responsible for application of the Covenant, as well
as among rights holders, an awareness of the content of the Covenant and of
the possibility of invoking it in the justice system…178
It follows from the foregoing that constitutional provisions providing for the
direct applicability of the ICESCR do not necessarily give rise to the application of
the Covenant by national courts and tribunals. States should take measure (such as
specialised training for judges, magistrates and parliamentarians) to promote the
domestic implementation of the Covenant by national authorities. In addition,
NGOs should pursue cases involving systematic violations of ESC rights in the
public interest in order to protect the underprivileged and marginalised populations
in society. This will help national courts to apply the ICESCR in interpreting
domestic law in order to develop the content of ESC rights and to define the nature
of obligations of both States and non-State actors.179
4 Conclusion
The ICESCR has significantly influenced the regional and, to some extent, domestic
legal protection of ESC rights in Africa. As noted above, the Covenant influenced
the explicit protection of ESC rights in the African Charter and in several
constitutions in Africa. While there is no consistent practice among African States,
there is an increasing trend towards more constitutional protection of many ESC
rights in Africa either as justiciable human rights or at least as ‘directive principles’
of State policy. Nevertheless, ESC rights have still not attained the same level of
protection extended to civil and political rights in the constitutions of many African
177 See, e.g., CESCR, Concluding Observations: Angola, UN Doc. E/C.12/AGO/CO/3 (1 December
2008) para. 9; Benin, E/C.12/BEN/CO/2 (9 June 2008) paras. 9 and 30; Chad, UN Doc. E/C.12/TCD/CO/
3 (16 December 2009) para. 9; Ethiopia, UN Doc. E/C.12/ETH/CO/1-3 (31 May 2012) para. 5; Morocco,
UN Doc. E/C.12/MAR/CO/4 (22 October 2015) paras. 9-10; Sudan, UN Doc. E/C.12/SDN/CO/2 (27
October 15) paras. 5–6; Rwanda, UN Doc. E/C.12/RWA/CO/2-4 (10 June 13) para. 6; Tunisia, UN Doc.
E/C.12/TUN/CO/3 (7 October 2016) paras. 7-8; Uganda, UN Doc. E/C.12/UGA/CO/1 (24 June 2015)
para. 5.
178 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Burundi, UN Doc. E/C.12/BDI/CO/1 (16 October 2015) paras.
5-6. See also CESCR, Concluding Observations: Chad, UN Doc. E/C.12/TCD/CO/3 (16 December 2009)
para. 7.
179 Kapindu (2013), pp. 125–151.
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States. Besides, the influence of the Covenant on national courts’ jurisprudence in
most African States remains limited. There are still several factors limiting the
realisation of ESC rights in Africa including non-compliance with domestic court
rulings in favour of ESC rights,180 political authoritarianism, high levels of
corruption,181 poverty,182 armed conflicts, limited engagement of NGOs and civil
society as well as lack of respect for the rule of law183 including lack of respect for
international and regional (quasi-) judicial bodies,184 as reflected in African States
non-compliance with the recommendations of the African Commission, non-
compliance with the judgments and orders of the African Court,185 and non-
compliance by African States (e.g. Malawi, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Djibouti, Uganda and South Africa) with obligations under the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court.186
180 See, e.g., Ibrahim Sangor Osman v. Minister of State for Provincial Administration and Internal
Security, Constitutional Petition No. 2 of 2011, [2011] eKLR, http://kenyalaw.org/Downloads_FreeCases/
Embu_Pet_2_2011.pdf; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Kenya, E/C.12/KEN/CO/2-5 (4 March 2016)
paras. 7–8.
181 See CESCR, Concluding Observations: Kenya, UN Doc. E/C.12/KEN/CO/2-5 (4 March 2016) paras.
17–18 and Olaniyan (2014); The Negative Impact of Corruption on the Enjoyment of Human Rights,
Human Rights Council Resolution 23/9, A/HRC/RES/23/9 (20 June 2013); Preventing and Combating
Corrupt Practices and the Transfer of Proceeds of Corruption, Facilitating Asset Recovery and Returning
such Assets to Legitimate Owners, in particular to Countries of Origin, in accordance with the United
Nations Convention against Corruption, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December
2014, A/RES/69/199 (5 February 2015).
182 The Fund for Peace (FFP) (The Fund for Peace 2015), Fragile States Index 2015: Fragility in the
World 2015, http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015. The Index is based on several indicators including
uneven economic development, poverty and human rights.
183 See, e.g., Matia Katabazi and 21 Others v. Secretary General of the East African Community and the
Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda, Reference No. 1 of 2007, http://www.saflii.org/ea/cases/
EACJ/2007/3.html; Gramara (Private) Limited and Another v. The Government of the Republic of
Zimbabwe (HC33/09), [2010] ZWHHC 1 (26 January 2010); Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v.
Fick & Others (657/11), [2012] ZASCA 122 (20 September 2012); Government of the Republic of
Zimbabwe v. Fick and Others (CCT 101/12), [2013] ZACC 22 (27 June 2013).
184 For example, although Uganda is a State party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 2187 UNTS 90, on 12 May 2016 Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni during his swearing in
speech extending his 30-year rule told visiting heads of State and representatives of the US and EU
member States in Uganda that: ‘We lost interest in the ICC [International Criminal Court]. […] ICC is
none of our business. It is a useless body. We had supported the ICC initially thinking they were serious
[…] but it is a bunch of useless people’. See Clottey (2016).
185 See, e.g., Interim Report of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights notifying the
Executive Council of Non-Compliance by a State, in accordance with Article 31 of the Protocol, http://
en.african-court.org/images/Other%20Reports/AFCHPR_Interim_Report__Non_compliance_by_a_
State__-_Libya.pdf.
186 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ‘Corrigendum to the Decision
Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the
Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad
Al Bashir’, ICC- 02/05-01/09-139-Corr, 13 December 2011; Pre-Trial Chamber I, ‘Decision pursuant to
article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the refusal of the Republic of Chad to comply with the cooperation
requests issued by the Court with respect to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir’,
ICC-02/05- 01/09-140-tENG, 13 December 2011; Pre-Trial Chamber II, ‘Decision on the Non-compliance
of the Republic of Chad with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court Regarding the Arrest and
Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir’, ICC-02/05-01/09-151, 26 March 2013; Pre-Trial Chamber
II, ‘Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Regarding Omar Al Bashir’s
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In order to enhance the influence of the ICESCR in Africa, these factors must be
addressed by implementing a wider range of comprehensive, necessary, appropriate
and effective legal, economic and educational measures, plans of action and policies
by States, including: (i) enacting and implementing domestic legislation to give
effect to the ICESCR; (ii) providing extensive training and conducting awareness-
raising campaigns on the ICESCR and the justiciability of ESC rights to politicians,
law makers, national and local civil servants, law enforcement officers, and students
at all levels of educations; (iii) training members of all professions and sectors that
have a direct role in the promotion and protection of human rights, including judges,
lawyers, prosecutors, civil servants, teachers, immigration officers, the military, the
police and other law enforcement officers on the domestic application of
international human rights treaties including specific training programmes on the
ICESCR; (iv) adopting and effectively implementing poverty reduction strategies,
in cooperation with relevant (non-governmental/civil society, regional and interna-
tional) organisations and institutions, which should fully integrate the ESC rights;
(v) ensuring accountability and transparency in the management of public funds and
in the conduct of public authorities and allocation of available resources to relevant
sectors, especially those addressed to the most disadvantaged and marginalised
social groups and individuals, in law and in practice; (vi) signing and ratifying,
without delay the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, which offers a complementary
and accessible forum of accountability for neglected ESC rights187; (vii) increased
use of strategic litigation as a means of achieving political recognition (irrespective
of the outcome or implementation of the cases) to support the empowerment of
marginalised individuals and groups such as indigenous peoples188; and (viii) timely
submission of periodic reports to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights including a compilation of case summaries and decisions adopted by
domestic courts and tribunals on the justiciability of ESC rights.
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Footnote 186 continued
Arrest and Surrender to the Court’, ICC-02/05-01/09-195, 9 April 2014; Pre-Trial Chamber II, ‘Decision
on the non-compliance by the Republic of Djibouti with the request to arrest and surrender Omar Al-
Bashir to the Court and referring the matter to the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of
the State Parties to the Rome Statute’, ICC-02/05-01/09-266, 11 July 2016; Pre-Trial Chamber II, ‘De-
cision on the non-compliance by the Republic of Uganda with the request to arrest and surrender Omar Al
Bashir to the Court and referring the matter to the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of
State Parties to the Rome Statute’, ICC-02/05-01/09-267, 11 July 2016; Decision under Article 87(7) of
the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for the arrest and
surrender of Omar Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-302, 6 July 2017.
187 See, e.g., IDG v. Spain, Communication No. 2/2014, UN Doc. E/C.12/55/D/2/2014 (13 October
2015); Miguel Ángel López Rodrı́guez v. Spain, Communication No. 1/2013, UN Doc. E/C.12/57/D/1/
2013 (20 April 2016).
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